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## PIETAS: HORACE AND AUGUSTAN NATIONALISM<sup>1</sup>

Students of the poet-critic Horace cannot fail to notice that fundamental cleavage in his thought which brings into sharp relief the opposition between the individualistic trend of his generation and the nationalist reaction initiated by the régime of Augustus. A century or more spent in imperialistic exploitation and in contact with the leavening influence of Greek thought and conduct was making itself felt in the last fifty years of the Republic. The well-born Roman was fast realizing the possibilities of both power and pleasure. After centuries of conformance to a strict patriarchal code and allegiance to the traditions of collective agrarian civilization, a staid aristocracy welcomed the expansiveness of luxury and unconventionality. Individualism was the order of the day; during these years Rome had her share of militarists, *laissez-faire* capitalists, freethinkers, and *bons vivants*. The signs were numerous that the urban population at least was ceasing to live by the bread of tradition alone. The orthodox religion, entirely legalistic in its approach to the deities, suffered from official neglect, lost prestige as a department of State and its old power as a social binder as well. By the proletariat it was passed over in favor of superstition and crude forms of mysticism, while the intellectuals accepted Epicurean determinism in its place or moved toward a philosophy of religion under the guidance of Stoic pantheism. Democratic institutions, the maintenance of which patriots believed to be Rome's mission, were violated in the interests of partisan politics; from Sulla to Caesar an authoritarian State with its basis in militarism had carried out its proscriptions, disregarded public security, and broken into hostile factions a nation which had prided itself on a united front. Liberalizing forces were at work in private life, corroding the puritanic *mores* of pre-Gracchan society and breaking down the family, which traditionally had been regarded as the unit of social structure. Horace characterized his generation as inert, sex-ridden, and in dire need of physical and moral training.

Materialism, irreligion, and political discontinuity were the major phases of the contemporary unsocial attitude which confronted the new régime of Augustus and which Horace in his double capacity of patriot and reflective man tried to counteract. One half of his thought is a pattern for living addressed directly to cultivated readers, disgruntled sophisticians, and an

aristocracy adrift from its moorings. It is a philosophy of individualism, but in a sense not acceptable to 'rugged individualists' of that day or this, that is, it called for the *qualitative* enrichment of life, the primary function of which in Horace's view is to experience, not to exploit. It offered a kind of security and inner poise to intelligent men living in a time of social and political transition, personal disillusionment, and defeat: that security lay in retreating from the shocks of life—to the country, preferably—and in the placid faith that good and evil must ultimately balance. Through a rational control of emotional expenditure all crude appetite, particularly the will to power and possession, was to be modified; and the energies thus released from preoccupation with future goals were to be rechanneled into the present and centered upon pleasurable experience, sensuous, esthetic, and intellectual. This redefinition of individualism was essentially a generalization of Horace's own quietistic outlook, and its importance as a solution of social problems was diminished by its negative emphasis and by its limited appeal to a small reading public composed largely of men of action.

But the poet had another side—that of the patriot and the lover of tradition. Here we are concerned with that section of his thought which is specifically nationalistic rather than critical, and with those partially government-inspired utterances which called for a return on the part of the whole nation to an idealized past, for the restoration of time-honored civic virtues, and for devotion to purposes larger and higher than personal interests.

If Horace's individualism may be viewed as an extension of his personal creed and as the complement and corrective of contemporary materialism and naturalism, in what light are we to judge his socio-political philosophy? One point is fairly clear: the amount of concern shown by Horace for the welfare of the Roman masses is almost negligible. As regards his political outlook one may feel reasonably sure that he is less frequently putting forward his own views than expressing approval of current policies of the administration. That this should be so in the case of a responsible critic who was at the same time virtually the poet laureate is not surprising. Beyond a doubt Horace was humanitarian in feeling, but he was first of all an individualist, and would have considered the modern philanthropic concern for the lives of others, realistically called 'polypragmosyne' by the Greeks, as a sin against individualism. Furthermore, the government had no program of social legislation, and to talk of improving the lot of the masses would have been irrelevant at a time when political issues were uppermost.

<sup>1</sup>In this paper translations of Horace which are enclosed within double quotation marks are those of Charles E. Bennett, Horace, The Odes and Epodes (The Loeb Classical Library, 1924).

It might be expected that Horace, under the pressure of his own conservatism, would have attempted to reinstate Greek political theory and would have reaffirmed that the good man is the good citizen and that complete ethical self-awareness can develop only within a nexus of group relationships and interactions. But of this there is no hint. The older relationship of citizen and State still existed theoretically. Horace tried to revitalize it, but in the spirit of a Roman patriot, not along the lines of Greek theory. The real problem now, however, was the definition of the individual's relation to society. In an expanding imperialistic civilization, in which centralization of authority and bureaucracy were becoming the order of the new day, and responsibility for the direction of national affairs and the formulation of foreign policy rested in the hands of a few men, it was no longer axiomatic that the 'good life' was possible only within the framework of the political community, or that in order to become a responsible ethical being a man must become a conscious political being also. In the experience of many the 'good life' was no longer something to be realized by the absorption of all persons into the collective life of a predatory and authoritarian State, nor was it self-evident that individual participation inevitably promoted communal welfare. It would have been impossible to crystallize the fluid opinion of Horace's generation regarding the nature of the State and a man's duties toward it, inconceivable that anyone should attempt to reconcile the liberalizing forces of the new individualism with the integrative tendency of old-fashioned political theory. Patriotic feeling for the oneness of Italy and her citizenry was being revived by Italophiles, but after the disruptive period of civil war it was still premature to reassert philosophically the sovereign claims of the State and to subordinate the privileges of individuals. Obviously the temper of the times discouraged independent formulation of sociological and political views worthy of the name.

For these reasons, Horace as a prominent literary personage dependent upon patronage and as a member of society rather than as a poet must have found it a practical necessity to become useful to the existing order and the mouthpiece of its propaganda. With respect to national issues an influential critic must choose between formulating his own ideology, propagandizing the official ideology, or remaining completely silent. Horace chose the middle ground, that of the patriot. We should accordingly expect his nationalist pronouncements to have little relation to his advocacy of individualism. And actually there is no vital connection between his personal and his political philosophy, such as would have been natural in the classical Greek environment. In the former, it is true, some of the elements later characteristic of Rousseauism are present, but the Roman poet lacked the range of vision and the depth of concern needed to weld them into a comprehensive theory<sup>1a</sup>.

There is as a matter of fact only one point of contact between Horace's individualism and his socio-political

<sup>1a</sup>See note 4, below.

thought. The first of the six introductory odes of the third Book (the Inaugural Odes), which contain his only sustained expression of political idealism, deals with the major theme of simplicity. Its position among the Inaugural Odes shows clearly that it was addressed not merely to the poet's usual reading public, but to all of Rome. The Horatian gospel of rationalism is broadcast essentially unchanged: the hierarchy of powers and the gradation of abilities and excellences which obtain in the social and political orders are severally levelled and cancelled by *Necessitas*, 'ineluctable Death' (5-16); the fact that death is inevitable should prove a powerful deterrent of self-seeking ambition and should impel a universal choice—if we grant that all men are rational—of the simple life (17-32). This ode sets out to give to the principle of self-limitation the universality which it lacks in the poet's addresses to individuals or to a narrow circle of readers, and to supply a panacea which may be employed by every member of society primarily for his own moral wellbeing and ultimately for the harmonization of the State. This is obviously not the usual type of piecemeal reform employed by governments, nor a demand for superficial social adjustments and repressive legislation. It proposes to correct the evils of civilization by eliminating materialism<sup>2</sup>. This is to be effected by enforcing a basic moral change in the members of society. Since the evils of civilization are assumed to be the cumulative effect of evils in human nature, the reform of society must be primarily an internal and organic reconstruction of individuals; once this is accomplished, the external reformation of civilization will have taken place automatically. In Horace's own terms, a preliminary clarification of the true purposes and values of living must compel every rational individual to minimize the desire for power and possession, and must lead him to exploit the potentialities of conscious existence; the resultant inner simplification will impress its objective counterpart upon the environment by simplifying the mechanics of living. Such, perhaps, is the theoretical basis underlying the ode. But the attempt here made by Horace to give the doctrine of simplicity a wide social relevance stands alone, and, if only for that reason, is inconsequential. Furthermore, by obtruding himself in the last two stanzas the poet converts what purports to be social theory into a personal ode. The effect of the whole is to make the benighted state of his contemporaries a foil to his own sanity and enlightenment. This antithesis is structurally appropriate in various odes addressed to individuals<sup>3</sup>, but the scope of a state ode should have admitted no personal reference.

The end-product of such a social process is not forecast, but it could only be a utopia, a healthy society based on a rudimentary economy and a normally robust peasantry, flourishing presumably in small agricul-

<sup>2</sup>See also *Carmina* 3.24.33-64. Horace would have agreed with modern nationalists who preach economic self-sufficiency, but for a different set of reasons. In his eyes the expansion of the capitalistic system into all corners of the Empire was an aggravation of the curse of money. When he is writing in an old wives' vein, even gainful occupation on the sea seems an act of *hybris* (compare the general context of *Carmina* 1.3.21-40).

<sup>3</sup>As e. g. in *Carmina* 3.16, 3.29.

rian communities not too large for every man to have a direct perception of his personal responsibility for the commonwealth<sup>4</sup>.

For the most part, what we find in Horace is not social theory at all, but the propaganda of nationalism. With Actium past and the hour of exultation over, the long day of reorganization began. Art was made to share the burden of reconstruction, as in the Nazi, Bolshevik, and Fascist régimes to-day. But an essential distinction is to be noted: anciently, self-expression and disinterested literary creation were not throttled as they are in Russia, nor was imaginative literature recast as a weapon of the proletariat in the 'revolutionary historic process'. The tendentious function then imposed on literature was fundamentally limited to furthering the chief interests of a nationalist State—ethnic unity, military dominance, and economic prosperity. It was obvious also that the astute Augustus should organize literature, even in that day when the reading public was comparatively small, in support of his work of political centralization. Within the limits of its influence, there was no better instrument for this purpose than the vehicle of literary suggestion, none more effective for evoking an aura of Republicanism, dissembling the constitutional status of the *princeps* or securing for his policies immunity from criticism. Not only was it necessary to justify the anomalous position of the ruler. An emotional driving force had to be released if the campaign for political unification was to be successful. A rallying point for disaffected patriots and old type Republicans had to be found. It was apparent that a nation peculiarly sensitive to the accents of tradition and the glamor of antiquity might be moved if the glories of a united past were cogently presented, if the old sense of corporate loyalty and conformance to collective interests could be reanimated<sup>5</sup>.

We are not here concerned with the literary worth of the odes in which Horace lent expression to the sentiments, both official and personal, of the cult of nationalism and reconstruction (declamatory as these odes may be by ordinary standards, they are at the same time unmistakably poetry), but with the technique of mass-suggestion employed by this chauvinist-in-spite-of-himself<sup>6</sup>. The publicists' art, besides being

<sup>4</sup>In this connection see the picture of the 'noble savage' given in *Carmina* 3.24.9–24. There is a strain of utopianism in Horace and it has obvious points of similarity to other utopian thinking, particularly the pre-industrial outlook of Rousseau. The emphases of Rousseauism are present, without the unifying theory: the preference given to rural life, the tirades against money and all its works, the moral necessity of simplicity, the indispensability of moral awareness for the wellbeing of any society in which the illusion of progress, i. e. automatic advancement of material civilization, blinds men to their moral inertia and corruption, and in which the multiplication of human wants leads to progressive moral deterioration. But a comparison of Horace and Rousseau must stop here. To proceed to assert that the Roman, like the Frenchman, was a romanticist on the ground that he loved Nature would beg the question. It is one thing to love Nature *qua* Nature, another to love homeland and countryside, which Horace evidently did. Also, Horace would probably have rejected the belief in human perfectibility, as he expressly does the natural goodness of men. His view of the origin of morality is that of the utilitarian: the sense of right and wrong is not innate, Nature is amoral (*Sermones* 1.3.113), and repressive morality was institutionalized as legislation because of its value as an instrument of social survival (*ibidem*, 111).

<sup>5</sup>For the idealized past and its traditions see *Carmina* 1.12.33–44, 2.15.10–20, 3.6.33–44, 4.15.12–16; *Epistulae* 2.1.18–27.

<sup>6</sup>In *Epistulae* 1.1.16–19 Horace admits that self-interest and the claims of public life conflict; in *Carmina* 3.3.69–72, 4.2.25–52, *Epistulae* 2.1.250–259 and elsewhere he disingenuously pleads inability to write patriotic odes.

less raucous then than to-day, was apparently more naïve, and more varied in its methods of attack. In general, three varieties of literary appeal may be distinguished—the moral, the romantic, and the religious. The first type was concerned with the moralizing of nationalistic emotions and policies, the second with the evocation of the pristine utopian State and with the conception of Manifest Destiny, the third with the 'hero' Augustus and the restoration of national prosperity through a return to *pietas* or semi-religious system of civic obligations to family, State, and deities.

These *Leitmotive* of the program of reconstruction find their best expression in the remaining Inaugural Odes (3.2–6) and in the *Carmen Saeculare*. The second poem of the former group, an ode lacking unity of structure and effect, combines two types of appeal, the moralistic and the religious. The first of these has as its subject the restoration of traditional militarism. Physical training in the army is urged upon the young men of the nation in order to condition them to the rigors of imperialism (1–12). The latter finds its justification not in economic considerations, but in the sentimental motive of revenging Roman defeat in Parthia and particularly in the moral incentive of self-sacrifice for country which it supplies to a faint-hearted generation (13–16)<sup>7</sup>. The weak treatment here given to this theme is offset by the fifth Inaugural Ode, which combines all three methods of appeal in a powerful defense of militarism. "... Augustus shall be deemed a god on earth..." for subjugating the Britons and the Parthians (2–4). This purely subsidiary justification of imperialism as part of the ruler's messianic mission is next reinforced moralistically. The heroic rôle of Roman soldiery in the past is belied by the lamentable morale of Crassus's Parthian army, which for twenty-five years has been living in "base wedlock with barbarian wives", and by a flabby Senate unable to direct foreign policy (5–12). Finally, the implied contrast between present supineness and past courage prepares the way for a long and moving passage on the gallantry of Regulus (13–56). Here, from a legendary act of austere self-sacrifice the art of the romanticist recreates the foremost of nationalist ideals in its pure irrationality, untainted by imperialistic implication.

The second half of the second Inaugural Ode (17–32) advocates the revival of integrity in politics and of fidelity to one's trust. These vague and indefinable virtues are best subsumed under *pietas*, a semi-religious and ramified conception to be discussed more fully below. Here the implication is that the individual in public life shall subordinate self-interest to that of the political community. It is a general characteristic of the vitalistic school of thought of which Horace is representative to assert that moral decisions shall be made in conformance to the good of the State rather

<sup>7</sup>A utilitarian justification of imperialism as a means of averting civil conflict is found in *Epodes* 7.1–10 and *Carmina* 1.35.36–40; a romantic justification of militarism as the chief agency in fulfilling the Manifest Destiny of Rome to hold preeminence among nations is found in Hannibal's speech, *Carmina* 4.4.49–72. For passages bearing on Augustus's military aspirations and achievements see *Carmina* 1.12.49–57, 35.29–32, 4.14, *Carmen Saeculare* 49–56; for his policy see *Carmina* 4.4.22–28 (his personal tutelage of the Neros) and 29–36 (a militaristic State requires a physically and morally disciplined aristocracy).

than with reference to abstract legal principles. Stress is laid upon emotionally connotative ideals such as honor, duty, loyalty, cooperation, integrity<sup>8</sup>, which are subjective standards having a wide range of interpretation, rather than upon more precise and rational conceptions, such as legality, justice, and contract. Not legislation so much as spontaneous moral change inspired by unattainable ideals was to curb temporizing in politics and naturalism in private life<sup>9</sup>. A race which was progressively deteriorating<sup>10</sup> was to be arrested in its course and was to receive lessons in the saving power of tradition. But the traditions inherited from pre-Gracchan Rome must have sounded in the ears of that amorphous generation very much as the sermons of Puritan divines would sound in our ears to-day. Disinterested loyalty and civic responsibility were empty words in a society which for more than two generations had been unable to guarantee its members personal security.

We must next consider the half romantic, half religious propaganda of political messianism, a purely literary phase of the reaction toward national unity. This movement, which found its first literary expression in 40, the date of Vergil's Fourth Eclogue, and had been growing for more than a decade before Horace published his own unofficial manifestos, sprang partly from revulsion against the terrorism and futility of the Civil War<sup>11</sup>, partly from the old Italophile faith in the Manifest Destiny of the Empire. After Actium the court poets of Maecenas's coterie had received official encouragement to propagandize the doctrine of Octavian's divine lineage and prerogatives. Reference was duly made by all except Horace to the advent of the political savior, in an effort to mystify the masses and to distract attention from the young ruler's anomalous status. In 27 Augustus rendered his momentous decision to continue Roman constitutional practices, repudiated his former pretensions to rule by the grace of God, and refused the divine honors accorded to Oriental and Hellenistic monarchs. It was doubtless a matter of some moment to the régime how the laureate, who had shown himself a die-hard Republican, would now express his approbation. In the same year, probably, Horace broke his long silence, and, perversely enough, issued a 'heterodox'<sup>12</sup> interpretation of the *princeps*'s status (3.3). Here, as elsewhere, he held to the middle of the road. Rejecting the theory of divine lineage and prerogatives as well as the legal formulation of the

principiate, he preferred to regard Augustus as an extraordinary man who, like the legendary culture-heroes Bacchus, Hercules, and Pollux, had rendered conspicuous service to mankind and deserved veneration during his lifetime, and, like them, deification at death (9-15).

The third and the fourth Inaugural Odes together constitute the esoteric theology of the non-existent cult of the 'hero' Augustus; the former is concerned with the 'hero's' superhuman status, the latter with his supernatural power. The third Inaugural Ode is a symbolic paean falling into two parts, and celebrates the Manifest Destiny of Rome<sup>13</sup> and the rôle played by Augustus in guaranteeing its future unfolding, which had been jeopardized by Caesar's monarchical designs. "The man tenacious of his purpose in a righteous cause" (1) is typified by various mythological benefactors and by the missioner Augustus. The latter, already surnamed 'the Revered', will be deified for his merit. This, we must infer from the symbolism of later verses, is the merit of having renounced absolutism and of having validated the primal purpose for which Rome was founded, the maintenance of democratic institutions. In the second division (18-68), Juno is made to capitulate to her invincible foe long enough to outline the Roman destiny (47-68). She is deferential, but makes that destiny contingent upon the eternal severance of Rome and Troy. Now to Horace's readers Troy was at once the birthplace of the nation which Caesar had planned to restore and make his capital and by association a symbol of Neareastern despotism and the divine right of kings. His readers knew also that the young Octavian had dallied with Caesar's romantic scheme, and the conservatives among them may have felt with Horace that Augustus by his adherence to Occidental political traditions had avoided a dire contingency in forestalling the interruption of Roman destiny and had thereby earned his title to immortality<sup>13a</sup>. The poet's restrained confession of faith may well have been reechoed in the hearts of reactionaries who wished above all for the unification of political Italy and saw in Augustus the only man capable of restoring order; at least the régime saw no reason to suppress it.

The fourth Inaugural Ode, an abstruse composition, abandons sense for sensibility and heightens symbolism to the point of mysticism. Its conventional title *Consilium* can hardly be taken at its face value. The clue to the significance of the Ode is seemingly to be found in its structure. The two apparently unconnected divisions, the descantation on the poet's uncanny control of circumstance (9-36) and the mythological allegory (37-80), may I think, be interrelated by reference to the dual rôle of Apollo as patron of poets and special

<sup>8</sup>For these and other civic virtues see *Carmen Saeculare* 57-58.  
<sup>9</sup>Horace recognized the futility of trying to legislate morality (*Carmina* 3.24.35-36 quid leges sine moribus vanae proficiunt?).

<sup>10</sup>See *Carmina* 3.6.45-48.

<sup>11</sup>Compare *Epodes* 16.1-14; *Carmina* 1.2.21-24, 35.33-40, 2.1.29-36, 3.6.13-16. The sixteenth *Epode*, written in 41 or 40, contains no hint of messianism, but in its lush romanticism of escape it equals the Fourth Eclogue.

<sup>12</sup>For Horace's heterodoxy in this regard and his adaptation of the formula of the Greek hero-cult see Tenney Frank, *Catullus and Horace*, 197-204, 226 (New York, Holt, 1928). The 'hero'-formula is used also in *Carmina* 3.14.1-4, 4.5.31-36, 15.25-32, *Epistulae* 2.1.1-17, but by no means so consistently as Professor Frank avers (204). Besides non-religious encomia (*Epode* 9, *Carmina* 4.2.33-44, 14.1-9, 33-52), we find Augustus equated with Mercury (*Carmina* 1.2.41-52), assigned to a place immediately below Jupiter in a hierarchy of deities, mythological and national heroes (*Carmina* 1.12.13-60), and termed 'god incarnate' (*praesens divos*, *Carmina* 3.5.2-3). In the fulsome eulogy of *Carmina* 4.5.1-30 he is more god than hero, although his status in domestic worship is on a plane comparable to that of a Greek hero (31-36).

<sup>13</sup>Other treatments of this theme occur in *Carmina* 4.4.49-76 and *Carmen Saeculare* 37-68.

<sup>13a</sup>In *THE CLASSICAL WEEKLY* 15.147-150 I reviewed *praeterea alia* W. Warde Fowler, *Roman Essays and Interpretations* (Oxford: At the Clarendon Press, 1920). On pages 149-150 I called attention to Fowler's discussion in this book of Horace, *Carmina* 3.1-6. On pages 217-218 Fowler treats the suggestion that Augustus had planned to transfer "the capital from Italy to the eastern Mediterranean. . . ." I considered also a paper entitled *Horace Carm. I 14*, by Walter Leaf, in the *English Journal of Philology* 34 (1918), 283-289, in which, discussing Horace, *Carmina* 1.14, 1.15, and 3.3, especially 57-60, Leaf held that these poems express Horace's opposition to the proposed transfer. C. K. >

tutelary deity of Augustus<sup>14</sup>. If we start from this assumption, a natural exegesis would be as follows. A beneficent theurgic power is exerted by Apollo through his two protégés. The effects of this influx vary according to their respective spheres of activity: on the one hand, Horace is enabled to lead a charmed life<sup>15</sup>, on the other, thanks to the principle of reason incarnate in Apollo, Augustus is enabled to exert an ordering influence upon chaotic political forces. It is significant that in the allegory Apollo is one of the chief combatants who clinch the victory for Jupiter over the unruly crew of Titans and Giants (60-64). It would be idle to examine the minutiae of the passage in the hope of identifying "the impious Titans and their frightful horde" (41) with individual political opponents of Augustus. The point to be brought out clearly is that the ode sets forth Horace's private conception of the nature of the *princeps*'s extraordinary ability and its supernatural source. Finally, we must ask what Horace means by *consilium* (65), the nominal theme of the poem. For the purposes of his theology 'wisdom' apparently is equivalent to *vis temperata* (66), power modified and directed by divine reason and amounting to semi-magical control over brute forces of nature or environment, as the case may be. So esoteric a conception came dangerously close to aligning Augustus with wonder-workers rather than with heroes<sup>16</sup>.

If the nationalists saw in the magnified figure of the *princeps* the promise of political unification and imperialistic prowess, they looked to organized religion for the restoration of public virtue and—as a direct effect of the latter—the return of economic prosperity.

The antique Roman had always stood in a purely utilitarian relationship to his deities; his piety had been essentially a matter of mechanical observance and ceremonial precision in which the letter counted for more than the spirit. *Pietas* in the religious sense never had the connotations of Christian 'piety': disinterested worship or adoration was an act inconceivable to the old Roman<sup>17</sup>. He always expected something in return for his *pietas*, usually the paraphernalia of material pros-

perity. Even the rituals performed by officials of the State for the benefit of the whole community were only larger stereotypes of the same attitude. But with the growth of self-consciousness and individuality and from contact with genuine religious 'enthusiasm' abroad, the Roman of the late Republic was beginning to acquire new perceptions and sensibilities. To a cultivated member of Horace's generation religion was ceasing to be merely a binding contract between man and deity, a higgling and basically commercial attitude; it might now mean exhilaration and escape from life, salvation, contemplation, absorption into the One. The time-honored respect for religion as a public institution and department of State was disappearing; religion was becoming a personal matter, as private as the emotions. It was losing its old social function and was taking on a new and deeper significance for individuals. Moreover, with the decay of *pietas* and the general neglect of the religious machinery of the State, a counter-trend had set in: this was the gradual replacement of the religious attitude by the fatalistic. Now, fatalism renders meaningless a morality practised purely in the interest of personal survival after death, as it does also the bargaining relationship implicit in the propitiatory acts of the worshiper. It clears the ground for the practice of morality purely as an instrument of adjustment to society rather than as a means of ensuring success in this life and entry into an after-life. Furthermore, when ethical standards are thus regarded as instruments rather than as ideals, i. e. as modes of behavior best calculated to effect the preservation of the individual within the social group rather than as self-justifying ends or agents in promoting the total welfare of society, the social virtues tend to become subordinate to the individualistic. Competition overrides cooperation, and sheer vitality does not stop to consider questions of abstract justice or public security. Obviously a militaristic State will draw upon these very reservoirs of raw vitality if its program includes imperialistic expansion, but before it can present a united front to foreign nations it must first regulate its unruly social forces.

This by-product of fatalism and the unsocial attitude fostered by current religious development were two major problems confronting the régime of Augustus. It was apparent that strong governmental controls had to be set up. But how? Influential conservatives who were incurably afflicted with nostalgia for the ancient past desired a return to the *mos maiorum*, and in official quarters grave apprehension was felt that the masses might run amuck in immorality and the sensationalism of Egyptian and Neareastern cults, for Antony and the implications of his behavior at Alexandria were not soon forgotten. Although some of these religious fads were barely gaining a foothold in Rome, their influence was felt to be menacing; they outraged every self-respecting Roman's sense of decency and reality sufficiently to provoke a reaction by themselves. At any rate the administration, acting from a variety of motives, some patriotic, others practical, sought to reimpose an archaic religious consciousness and ceremonialism upon a cynical proletariat and a freethinking or pantheistic intelligentsia. A restoration of poly-

<sup>14</sup>The two rôles are nowhere explicitly juxtaposed when Horace speaks both of himself and of Augustus; but in *Carmen Saeculare* 61-68 Apollo is conceived as presiding over the régime of Augustus and its future as well as over poetic inspiration.

<sup>15</sup>For the episodes see *Carmina* 1.22, 2.13, 2.17.27-30. Compare 3.11 (music's magic). The belief in the peculiarity of the poet's person may have been an outgrowth of the folklore which connected 'inspiration' with supernatural processes (for the ancient conception of literary creation as divine afflatus see W. Kroll, *Studien zum Verständnis der Römischen Literatur*, 24-34 [Stuttgart, J. B. Metzler, 1924]).

<sup>16</sup>For this extravagance Horace had a dubiously sound precedent in Plato, who in the tenth book of the Laws prescribed the practice of 'wisdom' along with three other cardinal virtues. Courage, self-control, and justice are fully discussed, but the prospective citizen of Utopia is left in the dark as to the meaning of 'wisdom', and purposely so, since this Platonic virtue consisted in esoteric mathematical knowledge (as we learn from the *Epinomis*) which was comprehensible only to the élite.

<sup>17</sup>Compare Cicero, *De Natura Deorum* 1.115-116 *Quid est enim cur deos ab omnibus colendis dicas, cum deo non modo homines non colant, sed omnino nihil carent, nihil agant?* At est eorum eximia quaedam praestansque natura, ut ea debeat ipsa per se ad se colendam allicere sapientem. . . . *Quae porro pietas ei debetur a quo nihil accepere, aut quid omnino, cuius nullum meritum sit, ei deberi potest?* . . . *Quam ob rem <dei> colendi sint non intellego, nullus nec accepto ab iis nec sperato bono.* The quotation forms part of the refutation by Cotta, the Academic, of the Epicurean conception of deity. The chief postulates of this were (1) the static existence of the gods in interstellar space and (2) their indifference to human prayers and desires. The criticism that it was fatuous to worship deity for its existential perfection alone, which is here put into the mouth of the Academic, was in fact Cicero's own view.

theism was carried out on an ambitious scale. The movement, conventionally known as the Augustan Revival, was not a campaign to arouse religious fervor; it was essentially a business-like reorganization of cults. Its official objectives were (1) the reestablishment of high secular standards of conduct and (2) the restoration of national prosperity. The latter motive is by no means to be regarded as disingenuous, inasmuch as the folk-mind habitually assumed that material blessings were the natural consequence of righteous dealing and due religious observance. However, since the ethical sanctions provided by Roman religion were limited and weak at best, one is inclined to discount the effectiveness of this 'Revival' as an agent of reform and to find its true importance elsewhere. In my opinion the movement may not improbably be viewed as nationalistic rather than as religious in significance, or, more specifically, as an energetic attempt to recapture for religion its old prestige as a civil institution and thereby reinstate it in its traditional function as a powerful instrument of social cohesion.

The propaganda and basic attitudes of this reaction may be read in Horace. Incidentally, a curious mixture of theologies is exhibited by the poet in the various moods and periods of his writing. On the one hand there is some evidence that as a member of the intelligentsia he was passing through a stage of belief—the stage of syncretism prior to monotheism—in which imagination or convenience fuses several divine personalities and attributes into a single composite, while, on the other hand, because he was a countryman and a conservative and because the imagery of mythology was the poets' stock in trade, he more regularly took the conventional attitude of the polytheist, which assigned a practical function or sphere of activity to each deity and assumed the existence of an intimate connection between the practice of morality and the general wellbeing of society. For many these articles of belief remained commonplaces, but Horace in his fervent idealization of the past, in which society had been integrated by *iustitia adversus deos* and loyalty to collective interests heightened them into a religion of nationalism.

In the sixth Inaugural Ode the laureate presents the negative evidence for the faith that was in him. The disgrace of the Civil War and the failure of foreign campaigns are traced directly to the malevolence of slighted deities and to the nation's emancipated attitude toward sexual relationships (7-32)<sup>18</sup>. In point of character and achievement, it is intimated, the contemporary generation was the negation of that manly "brood of peasant soldiers" "that dyed the sea with Punic blood, and struck down Pyrrhus and great Antiochus and Hannibal, the dire. . ." (33-38), and it must expect to expiate vicariously the guilt inherited from the preceding generation until it has returned to the ancient ways (1-4). Important as the rectification of internal conditions is in the poet's eyes, he feels that the jeopardizing of Rome's sovereign position as mistress of the

world is the paramount issue forced upon his generation by its own irreligion. "Tis by holding thyself the servant of the gods < O Roman, > that thou dost rule. . ." (5). The entire success of imperialism in the past seems to Horace to have rested not so much on a physical as on a moral basis: Rome's extensive and well-knit empire was at once the emolument of virtue and the product of a morality which regimented every citizen for the sake of a common cause. This ode, which ends on a note of sentimental idealism, was both a challenge to the nation's conscience and pride and a program of agenda submitted to the new administration.

An impressive declaration of faith in the workability of religion in national reconstruction is contained in the Carmen Saeculare, which Horace was commissioned to write for the celebrations of June, 17 B. C. The idea originally underlying the Secular Games was the need for periodic absolution of the nation. This had been rationalized to correspond with a cyclical interpretation of history: the guilt and the distress of the preceding 100 (or 110) years were to be 'buried' (*saeculum condere*) and thus ritually prevented from tainting the fresh life of a new epoch. Previously the rites had been entirely chthonian in character and the attention of the celebrants had been centered upon the past. But this was not the case in the Augustan observance; in the laureate's hymn the mood of penitence is replaced by one of optimism, and the earth-deities are overshadowed by the Republican Jupiter and particularly by Apollo, the tutelary deity of the ruler and his régime. The tone of the whole is that of a resurgent people anxious to put the past behind it and to enter the new era which is under the dispensation of "the glorious scion of Anchises and Venus. . ." (Carmen Saeculare 50) and in which fertility and fidelity (13-20), agricultural prosperity (29-32), the successful issue of foreign wars (49-56), and the safeguarding of the Empire (61-68) are blessings to be vouchsafed by supernatural powers once more when the restoration of "Faith and Peace and Honour and ancient Modesty and neglected Virtue" has been completed (57-58).

The sixth Inaugural Ode was written probably about 27, before Augustus's reform of society by punitive legislation and the reorganization of the state religion were well under way. By 13, when Horace published the fourth Book of his Odes, the régime had done much reconstructive work and the poet found his beliefs justified by actualities. His statements accordingly shift from the negative emphasis of the earlier ode (3.6) and the expectant mood of the Carmen Saeculare to positive acclamations; and his respect for traditional principles of conduct is exceeded only by his respect for the ruler who has energized those principles and demonstrated their truth. ". . . Thy age, O Caesar, has restored to farms their plenteous crops and to our Jove the standards strip from the proud columns of the Parthians; has closed Quirinus' fane empty of war; has put a check on licence, passing righteous bounds; has banished crime and called back home the ancient ways whereby the Latin name and might of Italy waxed great, and the fame and majesty of our

<sup>18</sup>Similar sentiments are to be found in Carmina 1.2.1-24 (an inundation of the Forum as an aftermath of the war and direct evidence of divine displeasure) and 1.35.33-38 (the war and the moral débâcle as effects of atheism and sacrilege).

dominion were spread from the sun's western bed to his arising"<sup>19</sup>. Economic prosperity, ethnic unity, military prestige and the security of the Empire have, in the poet's view, all been actualized in the nationalist movement which had its point of departure in moral and religious reorganization.

The sentiment that the greatness of Rome rested on her ancestral ways and that the most typical expression of her culture consisted in the *mos maiorum* was one frequently voiced by her publicists and orators. The modern student of the development of Rome cannot fail to recognize in the richer term *pietas* one of her living traditions and a major conception of social organization inherited from early agrarian times. It was not by accident that the nationalist reaction after the Civil War proceeded toward its goal along lines laid down centuries before. For *pietas* had achieved in the primitive community precisely what nationalism set out to achieve in a complex society—the subordination of the individual to the State. The original conception had never implied merely group religiosity, but rather a whole system of duties which the citizen owed to family, deities, and political community<sup>20</sup>: it did not proceed from the hypothesis that individual regeneration was socially beneficial, but demanded collective adherence to the codes of self-restricting and cooperative groups. It was not based on any abstract theory of right and wrong, or on received ecclesiastical dogma; it was essentially a pragmatic formula which had traditionally proved itself successful in coordinating social forces. During the generations when the cooperative virtues were essential to the survival of the group, when self-interest and expression were too dangerous to be tolerated and when the scope of morality was still delimited by the social good<sup>21</sup>, it made for solidarity if not for true religion or individual freedom. From the beginning its sanctions had been unassailable by reason of the fact that group welfare was regarded as dependent in the last analysis upon supernatural powers whose desires had to be scrupulously satisfied.

Thus the call to *pietas* set up by the conservatives implied a recrudescence of a primitive organic view of life. It was a plea to abandon the egocentricities of individualism, to submit once more to group moralities, to cooperate for the good of the State as a whole. Viewed in this light, the program of reform was thoroughly reactionary: it demanded the harmonization of new sympathies and standards with an older outlook which was still romantically appealing, but now lacked the compelling force born of necessity. It is obvious that in a complex civilization the interests of the members of

society can no longer coincide at all points with those of the State. This was particularly true of the individualistic religious attitude of the time, with the result that the restoring of polytheism from purely sociological motives temporarily retarded normal development. Yet it is perhaps as a practical measure to rehabilitate the national prestige and collective sense that this reaction has its truest and deepest significance: as such it was well adapted to reestablish ethnic unity in a disrupted people, a dominant element of which still cherished an extraordinary respect for the united past and its traditions.

To the nationalism of Augustus's régime, reflected for us in Horace, that of Fascist Italy presents a significant contrast. Like the ancient reactionary program, Fascism exalts the State and demands the subordination of individuals, moves in the direction of powerful governmental control and social uniformity, and sets up secular standards which claim to govern the whole life of the citizen. Once again in Italy high spiritual value attaches to the civic virtues, particularly heroism, and devotion to the 'totalitarian' State which, to compensate for the loss of individual liberty, assures its citizens of self-fulfillment. In the lofty abstractions of Fascist theory the all-embracing State is an entity with a personality and a will of its own and is the supreme agency for the realization of human ideals and potentialities; on this basis alone can it justify its demand for submission to its benevolent purposes. Mussolini writes thus<sup>22</sup>:

... Lo stato non è il guardiano notturno che si occupa soltanto della sicurezza personale dei cittadini; non è nemmeno un'organizzazione a fini puramente materiale, come quella di garantire un certo benessere... Lo stato, come il fascismo lo concepisce e attua, è un fatto spirituale e morale, perché concreta l'organizzazione politica, giuridica, economica della nazione, e tale organizzazione è, nel suo sorgere e nel suo sviluppo, una manifestazione dello spirito. Lo stato è garante della sicurezza interna ed esterna, ma è anche il custode e il trasmettitore dello spirito del popolo, così come fu nei secoli elaborato nella lingua, nel costume, nella fede. Lo stato non è soltanto presente, ma è anche passato e soprattutto futuro.

It is this conception of the spiritual nature of the State as the embodiment of the history and the collective life of the people that gives it virtually a religious sanction and differentiates the Fascist conception from the ancient conceptions. In antiquity political theory endorsed religion as the ultimate safeguard of society's wellbeing, economic as well as moral; modern 'totalitarian' theory at its highest point of development regards the State as a substitute for religion.

Thus the ideals held before the Italian people are mystical and unattainable to a degree unparalleled in antiquity<sup>23</sup>. But the arousing of religiosity and faith is not considered an end in itself. Feeling must be accompanied by constructive action and direction must be given to emotion by logic. The basis of social organization is shifted from politics to economics, for upon a massive financial foundation rests the mechanized

<sup>19</sup>Carmina 4.15.4–16. Compare also 4.5.  
<sup>20</sup>The religious significance, however, was frequently separated from the social; compare Cicero, *De Natura Deorum* 1.116 est enim *pietas iustitiae* adversus deos, with Cicero, *De Re Publica* 6.15 *iustitiam cole et piatem*, quae cum sit magna in parentibus et propinquis tum in patria maxima est. Originally signifying the austere code regulating the good citizen's whole life, *pietas* came to include good etiquette also. Alongside the traditional meaning there arose the connotation of 'civil conduct', 'civility', 'kindness' which ultimately was specialized by pagan humanitarians as 'piety'. Still later the Church revived the word in its religious sense, and 'piety' became one of the cardinal Christian virtues. The social significance was irrelevant now that man's whole duty was God-centered.

<sup>21</sup>Compare Cicero, *De Re Publica* 1.1 *Unum hoc definio, tantam esse necessitatem virtutis generi hominum a natura tantumque amorem ad communem salutem defendandam datum ut ea vis omnia blandimenta voluptatis otiumque vicerit.*

<sup>22</sup>Encyclopedie Italiana, Volume 14, the article *Fascismo*.

<sup>23</sup>Political idealism received mystical and religious sanction in the *Somnium Scipionis*: see Cicero, *De Re Publica* 6.9–26.

superstructure of modern civilization. The material development of Italy, until lately an impoverished country and a third-rate power, has been accelerated enormously during the last decade: to this end the energies of all are being completely routinized and the nation's industrial plant is being coordinated with the total needs of the people.

It is true that the intuitive ideals of nationalism—ethnic unity and prosperity, military security, and glorification of race—always remain the same, but the technique of realizing them in modern Italy is not the technique that was used in the Rome of Augustus. The technique of the ancient nationalism was vitalistic: it was predominantly an appeal to idealism and an attempt to reorganize society by releasing the emotions—sentimental, romantic, moral, religious—of a whole people. But to-day the chief criterion of greatness in a civilized nation has become the degree of its mechanization, and Fascism in its efforts to translate feeling into action has supplemented the older vitalistic method with a new and formidable technique of rationalization.

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### REVIEW

*A History of the Roman Republic.* By Cyril Robinson. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company (1932). Pp. xii, 471.

Mr. Cyril Robinson's book, *A History of the Roman Republic*, is a competent narrative of the history of the Roman Republic to the death of Caesar, written by a man who understands the problems of Roman history and the methods of presenting material effectively to students.

The contents are as follows:

Preface (vii–viii); I, Land and People (1–9); II, The Etruscans and Rome (10–27); III, The Republic and Its Ordeal (28–55); IV, Rome's Conquest of Italy (56–82); V, The First Punic War (83–96); VI, Between the Wars (97–106); VII, The Second Punic War (107–132); VIII, Effects of the Second Punic War (134–145); IX, The Extension of the Empire: First Phase (146–162); X, The Extension of the Empire: Second Phase (163–179); XI, Problems of the Empire: Italy and Rome (180–202); XII, The Constitutional Issue (203–216); XIII, Hellenism and Its Fruits (217–231); XIV, The Gracchi (232–256); XV, Marius and the Senate (257–277); XVI, The Rise of Sulla (278–308); XVII, The Rise of Pompey (309–352); XVIII, The Rise of Caesar (353–390); XIX, Caesar's Triumph and Death (391–423); XX, Roman Life and Character (424–441); XXI, Epilogue (442–454); Chronological Tables (455–466); Index (467–471).

Mr. Robinson brings to his task an enthusiasm for Roman history, an interest in its technical problems, and at the same time a fresh viewpoint which makes his work easy to read. The style is simple and direct;

the author slips occasionally into a colloquial tone which adds vividness to his narrative. He is aware of the value of good maps: the book contains fourteen of these, all simple and effective, some decidedly novel. Of the book in general it may be said that it can be put in the hands of students of the Roman Republic with perfect confidence.

If one were to quarrel at all with the plan of the book, it would be only on the ground that the material is unevenly balanced, as is usually the case with textbooks of Roman history. One-third of the volume is devoted to the period from Marius to Caesar. This distortion can be justified only by the fact that practically every historian of the Roman Republic is guilty of the same practice. It must be admitted that the author gives an excellent description of political issues and personalities during the first century before Christ. There is no reason, however, why 70 out of 471 pages should be devoted to the career of Caesar.

At all points Mr. Robinson shows a laudable desire to present the facts from a critical viewpoint that is fresh and novel. But he does not lose his balance in becoming merely individualistic. For example, he treats the Etruscan domination as analogous in growth and operation to a Greek tyranny (18–19). His analysis of Roman character before the full advent of Hellenism (143–146) is shrewd, as are also his sympathetic accounts of the Gracchi (232–257), of the character of Pompey (317–318), and, especially, of Lucullus (323–326). He is, in fact, at his best in character analysis, and a clever evaluation of the work of the Younger Cato (408) is one of the minor high lights of the book.

There are of course points on which a reviewer is tempted to disagree. Mr. Robinson accepts 509 B. C. as the date of the first treaty with Carthage (25), but entirely underestimates the importance of this treaty. He cites the "celebrated slogan" *delenda est Carthago* (175) without any indication that there is no adequate evidence for the yarn. His account of Jugurtha (259–264) has the usual air of unreality which is the sign of too complete dependence on Sallust. A little more stress on the difficulty of African terrain and a little less on the charges of senatorial corruption would have given the account greater plausibility. In his narrative of the distressing struggles in Rome during the first century B. C. Mr. Robinson falls into the easy habit of blaming the new spirit of the mob on the influx of "oriental blood" (288–301).

But these are, after all, minor faults. The book can be recommended without reserve as an excellent workmanlike textbook for students of Roman history. There are included extremely full chronological tables (455–466) which students will find very helpful.

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